Czy milczenie jest intencjonalne? Szkic do analizy fenomenologicznej
Abstract
The aim of this article is to catch a glimpse of just a few selected aspects of silence on phenomenological grounds. In this context, I put the question of whether silence is intentional.
Both categories: “silence” and “intentionality” are very heavily loaded with philosophical meaning and cannot be clearly (unambiguously) explained.
After the adoption of certain generally accepted assumptions and intuitions, it turns out that it is easier to describe silence as intentional than non-intentional; one can talk about intentionality of silence in the positive and negative sense. But it is also possible to understand silence in the perspective of the phenomenological method and to think of silence as non-intentional when:
(a) silence precedes intentionality and perhaps even silence is a prerequisite for intentionality,
(b) silence is understood as the effect of cognition, the result of direct experience.
Both categories: “silence” and “intentionality” are very heavily loaded with philosophical meaning and cannot be clearly (unambiguously) explained.
After the adoption of certain generally accepted assumptions and intuitions, it turns out that it is easier to describe silence as intentional than non-intentional; one can talk about intentionality of silence in the positive and negative sense. But it is also possible to understand silence in the perspective of the phenomenological method and to think of silence as non-intentional when:
(a) silence precedes intentionality and perhaps even silence is a prerequisite for intentionality,
(b) silence is understood as the effect of cognition, the result of direct experience.
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