Roberta Lockiego internalizm deontologiczny

Abstract

The deontological internalism has recently received a renewed kind of defence proposed by R. Lockie. The paper provides an overview of his key theses and discuss the main problems that arises from some of them. Lockie’s perspectivism seems to stay in conflict with the possibilities of empirical establishing of individual epistemic limits and because of that implies some troubles for possibility of determining rules of directing the mind. Lockie’s theory doesn’t explain the relation between voluntary directed epistemic processes and mechanisms of producing beliefs and doesn’t consider obstacles connected with his derivative epistemic appraisal. Subjective rationality seems to imply situationism in understanding of rationality and scepticism about possibility of appraisal of past epistemic acts, and conflict with culture perspectivism. The transperspetivistic condition doesn’t work when subjectively justified methods exclude the objective possibility of knowing the truth. The possibility of culturally justified lack of concept of objective epistemic values, imply impossibility of subjective justification and rationality.