Indywidua, modi, supposita. Jan od św. Tomasza o indywiduacji cnót
Abstract
Michał Głowala
Individuals, modi, supposita. John of St. Thomas on the Individuation of Virtues
Abstract
The paper analyses the main argument of John of St. Thomas (Cursus theologicus, I-II, disp. 13, q.6, n. 739) against Durand of St. Pourçain’s thesis that when a moral or epistemic virtue of someone gets more intense or deeper, the old trope of the virtue is just replaced by a new one. I consider the general question: when a change in which something becomes more and more F consists in one and the same trope of F increasing in some way (while retaining its identity). I analyse various applications of this general question in case of various predicates F and confront them with John’s general argument; this sheds some light on the question of tropes in general, and in particular on the existence of some accidental tropes which undergo some types change retaining their identity. I argue that there are fundamentally different kinds of tropes or kinds of individuality, and that instances of natures (individuals) should be distinguished both from modi and from supposita.
Keywords: virtue, substance, accident, individuation, modus, suppositum.
Individuals, modi, supposita. John of St. Thomas on the Individuation of Virtues
Abstract
The paper analyses the main argument of John of St. Thomas (Cursus theologicus, I-II, disp. 13, q.6, n. 739) against Durand of St. Pourçain’s thesis that when a moral or epistemic virtue of someone gets more intense or deeper, the old trope of the virtue is just replaced by a new one. I consider the general question: when a change in which something becomes more and more F consists in one and the same trope of F increasing in some way (while retaining its identity). I analyse various applications of this general question in case of various predicates F and confront them with John’s general argument; this sheds some light on the question of tropes in general, and in particular on the existence of some accidental tropes which undergo some types change retaining their identity. I argue that there are fundamentally different kinds of tropes or kinds of individuality, and that instances of natures (individuals) should be distinguished both from modi and from supposita.
Keywords: virtue, substance, accident, individuation, modus, suppositum.
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