Davida Chalmersa argument z pojmowalności w kontekście apriorycznego materializmu

Abstract

David Chalmers’ Conceivability Argument and the Type-A Materialism

In The Conscious Mind David Chalmers proposed one of the most sophisticated arguments against materialism: the argument from the logical possibility of zombies (which is, indeed, a variant of the classical conceivability argument). The reasoning has been often attacked by physicalists. One of the possible stances is known as the type-A physicalism (a priori physicalism). The proponents of this view usually assume that: (a) phenomenal facts are a priori deductible from physical facts and the relation between them is logical rather than nomological one; (b) there is no epistemic gap; (c) the hard problem of consciousness does not exist. In this paper I present how Chalmers replies to these arguments. In conclusion I try to predict the direction of the future discourse.

Keywords: David Chalmers, the conceivability argument, zombies, dualism, qualia, consciousness, philosophy of mind.